Children of the World
Background and History
Throughout the history of many countries, children have become more involved in military actions. Not because these kids want to, but because they are forced to join. During the 1800’s, Child soldiers were not the first role for young children. Children started to act as aides, servants, armor bearers, etc. According to UNICEF (2003), children were being bought and sold and they would move wherever their owner would tell them to move. Since these practices came before child soldiers, leaders like those in Uganda considered this type of role for children but made it more inhumane and took into consideration for kids to become soldiers.
EUROPE
Countries like Greece, Norway, Iceland and many other European countries, took into consideration these ideas of using children. During the Children Crusade, thousands of children were recruited under the idea that they would be able to take over the enemy. Children as young as 12 years old were taken from their families and have them take a role in war. They would not fight but they would be present during the gun fighting.
A lot of inhumane actions were done to children that may have lead into the idea of child soldiers. An example of this is making them slaves. Because of this, the children’s masters demanded them to join the army if they wished their freedom. According to UNICEF (2003), Many children started fighting wars like the Paraguayan War, Boshin War and many more battles. During the First World War, the youngest soldier was eight years of age. Because of this action of using a kid during the war, it has made other leaders use the same strategy such as Kony.
THE BEGINNING OF LRA
In Uganda, a strong rebellious group named LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) was established. It has become such a powerful group; the government of Uganda required the citizens to enter a government camp to supposedly create safety and protection. But on the contrary it caused a lot of disease and violence.
Soon the LRA took control of these camps. The leader of this group, Joseph Kony, ordered his people to attack villages and abduct children in Congo. This lasted about ten years until the government of Uganda and the rebellious group of LRA, agreed to sign a peace treaty. When the treaty was ready to be signed, the leader of LRA, Joseph Kony kept postponing the date, which they would get together and sign it together in order to find peace.
It took two years for the government of Uganda to realize that Joseph Kony was not going to sign the agreement. Therefore, Uganda, The Democratic Republic of Congo, The Central African Republic, and Sudan, and help from the U.S., an operation called “Lighting Thunder” was put into action. The operation did not work due to an intelligence leak about the raid and Kony was able to escape in time. This escape from Kony helped the spread of his army, The LRA. The LRA spread all over Africa. This resulted in a lot of corruption and a lot of deaths. Kony would specialize in attacking villages, which made it easier to abduct children.
Till this day, abduction of children and training them to become soldiers is still happening in our world. To give an idea of how many kids are made into soldiers, in 1988 only, an estimation of 200,000 children below of 16 years age have been titled as foot soldiers for over 25 countries (UNICEF, 2003). In the year 2012, an estimation of 300,000 children soldiers were active in conflicts around the world. Within this statistic, armies, militias, gangs, terrorist organizations are taken into consideration. Thousands of children are living their childhood walking around with assault rifles, with bombs strapped around their chest. Many have been saved but many more are still under the command of fighting and killing innocent people.
References
Mason, M. A. (2005). The U.S. and the International Children's Rights Crusade: Leader or Laggard?. Journal Of Social History, 38(4), 955-963.
References
Karlin, B., & Matthew, R. A. (2012). Kony 2012 and the Mediatization of Child Soldiers. Peace Review, 24(3), 255-261. doi:10.1080/10402659.2012.704222